Inter-company loan waivers: why the common shareholder is not taxable on a distribution?

The wider view

A view has gained currency in certain quarters of the profession that a release of a debt between two companies owned by the same individual is a distribution to that individual. It first appeared in an article in Tax Journal a few years ago. In this piece we call it the wider view.

Take an example. Mr X owns all the shares in Company A and all the shares in Company B. Company A has lent £1m to Company B, and Company A releases the loan by deed for no consideration. On the wider view, the release moves value out of Company A to Company B, that is a distribution by Company A, and Mr X is chargeable to income tax at the dividend rates on it. That is so even though he is not a party to the release and receives nothing. The charge is said to be measured on the market value of the debt released.

The wider view reaches an income tax charge on Mr X through this statutory chain:

  1. s.383 ITTOIA 2005 charges income tax on “dividends and other distributions of a UK resident company”.
  1. “Distribution” has the meaning given by s.989 ITA 2007, which applies across the Income Tax Acts; Sch 4 ITTOIA 2005 indexes it.
  1. s.989 ITA 2007 adopts the meaning in Part 23 CTA 2010.
  1. Para B, s.1000(1) CTA 2010, includes “any other distribution out of assets of the company in respect of shares in the company”

In short, if the release is a distribution within Part 23 CTA 2010, the wider view treats it as a distribution chargeable under Chapter 3 of Part 4 ITTOIA 2005, with Mr X as the person chargeable.

Our view is different.

We accept that, as a matter of company law, the release may be a distribution by Company A and must comply with the rules on distributions. We do not accept that Mr X is chargeable to income tax on it, for two reasons:

  • The release is not a distribution “in respect of shares” in Company A within Para B, s.1000(1), CTA 2010, because nothing is done to Mr X as a holder of Company A’s shares.
  • Even if it were, s.385 ITTOIA 2005 charges only the person to whom the distribution is made or treated as made, or who receives or is entitled to it. Mr X is none of these.

The wider view’s chain defines a distribution; it never identifies Mr X as its recipient. This piece sets out where we agree with the wider view, where its reasoning breaks down, and some practical points.

The company law position

As a matter of company law, a transfer of value by a company for the benefit of its shareholder can be a distribution even where the immediate recipient is not a member. In Aveling Barford Ltd v Perion Ltd [1989] BCLC 626, Aveling Barford sold property at a substantial undervalue to Perion, a company controlled by Dr Lee, who also controlled Aveling Barford. Although in form a sale, Hoffmann J held that it was in substance a disguised return of capital, made when Aveling Barford had no distributable reserves, and therefore unlawful. Perion, which knew the facts, held the property on constructive trust for Aveling Barford.

More on unlawful distributions appears in our blog post: Tax and company law consequences of an illegal dividend.

Progress Property Co Ltd v Moorgarth Group Ltd [2010] UKSC 55 confirms that the characterisation is a matter of substance, not label. The Supreme Court held that a sale at an undervalue to a related company is not automatically an unlawful distribution. The question is whether the transaction was a genuine arm’s length commercial transaction or, in reality, a return of value to members; the directors’ state of mind is relevant only so far as it sheds light on that question.

The wider view is therefore right that Company A’s release may be a distribution in company law. Our disagreement is with the next part: that Mr X is chargeable to income tax on it.

Distributable reserves: a company law condition, not a tax test

Before releasing the loan, Company A’s directors should be satisfied that Company A has distributable reserves at least equal to the net book value of the debt (s.830 and s.836 CA 2006). They must also consider Company A’s position since the date of the relevant accounts, as the common law requires. If the reserves are insufficient, the release may be unlawful, the directors may be in breach of duty, and the value may be recoverable.

This requirement decides whether the release is lawful. It does not decide whether the release is a distribution for tax purposes, nor who is taxed on it. Part 23, s.1000(1), CTA 2010 does not ask whether the paying company had distributable reserves. Sufficient reserves therefore do nothing to bring the release within Para B, s.1000(1), CTA 2010 or to make Mr X chargeable, and insufficient reserves do not take it outside.

The point matters to our argument in one respect only. If the release is unlawful, company law requires the value to be restored to Company A, and it is recoverable from Company B, which holds it, not from Mr X. That supports the conclusion, developed below, that company law treats Company B, not the individual shareholder, as the recipient.

Where the wider view’s chain breaks

The wider view treats its chain as complete once the release fits Para B, s.1000(1), CTA 2010. But the chain only defines what a distribution is. It says nothing about who is chargeable.

s.383 ITTOIA 2005 is impersonal: it charges distributions, not shareholders. s.384 ITTOIA 2005 measures the charge by the amount or value of the distributions made. The link to a particular taxpayer is made by a separate provision, s.385 ITTOIA 2005, which the wider view passes over.

In our view the chain breaks at two points: at Para B itself, and at s.385 ITTOIA 2005.

First: Para B, s.1000(1), CTA 2010 is not satisfied

Para B requires a distribution “out of assets of the company in respect of shares in the company”. The wider view reads “in respect of shares” as a test of purpose: the release would not happen but for the common ownership, so it must be in respect of Mr X’s shares in Company A.

Part 23 CTA 2010 gives the phrase a narrower meaning. s.1113(3) CTA 2010, carrying forward the former s.254(12) ICTA 1988, provides that a thing is regarded as done in respect of a share if it is done to a person (a) as the holder of the share, or (b) as the person who held the share at a particular time. The test asks to whom the thing is done, and in what capacity, not why.

In our example the release is done to Company B. Company B holds no shares in Company A. Nothing is done to Mr X at all, still less to him as holder of Company A’s shares. In our view the release is not a distribution within Para B, whatever its status in company law.

The wider view might reply that s.1113(3) CTA 2010 states when a thing “is regarded as” done in respect of a share: a sufficient condition, not an exhaustive definition, leaving room for a broader ordinary meaning. We think that reply is weak. s.1113(3) is the only guidance Part 23 gives on the phrase, and it is framed entirely by reference to the person and their capacity as holder. That is a strong indication of what Parliament meant by the ordinary words as well.

The structure of Part 23 CTA 2010 supports our view. s.1020 CTA 2010 deals specifically with transfers of assets or liabilities at an undervalue, and it is confined to transfers between a company and its members. Where Parliament wanted to reach value passing to someone other than the shareholder, it said so expressly: s.1064 CTA 2010, for example, treats certain benefits provided by a close company to a participator’s associate as distributions. There is no equivalent provision for a transfer to a sister company.

Second: s.385 ITTOIA 2005 does not point to Mr X

Even if the release were a distribution within Para B, Mr X is chargeable only if s.385 ITTOIA 2005 points to him. It makes chargeable the person to whom the distribution is made or is treated as made, or the person receiving or entitled to it. Importing the Part 23 CTA 2010 definition through s.989 ITA 2007 does not satisfy, or dispense with, that separate requirement.

None of the limbs, in fact, fits:

  • Made to him: the distribution is not made to Mr X. Company A releases Company B, not him.
  • Treated as made to him: nothing deems it to be. Part 23 CTA 2010 contains no rule attributing a transfer to a sister company to the common shareholder.
  • Received by him: no asset, payment or credit passes to Mr X.
  • Entitled to it: Mr X has no right against Company A, as shareholder or otherwise, to the debt or its value.

The entitlement limb is informed by HMRC v Gould [2024] UKUT 285 (TCC). The Upper Tribunal held that s.1168(1) CTA 2010, under which dividends are treated as paid when they become due and payable, applies for the purposes of s.384 ITTOIA 2005, because that provision is part of the Corporation Tax Acts. It was common ground that a dividend is due and payable when the shareholder has a right to enforce payment. The Tribunal decided the case by asking what enforceable right the shareholder had against the company under company law, by reason of the rights attached to his shares.

Gould concerned the timing of a dividend paid to a known shareholder, not the identity of the recipient of some other distribution, so it is not direct authority. But it shows the income tax charge being tied to the shareholder’s enforceable rights, as shareholder, against the paying company. In our example Mr X has no such right at any point.

What Mr X experiences is an economic consequence, not a receipt. Because he owns all the shares in both companies, the release reduces Company A’s net assets and increases Company B’s by a matching amount: the asset Company A gives up is the liability Company B no longer owes. Leaving aside tax at company level, his combined wealth is unchanged, and the value remains inside companies he owns. Income tax on distributions charges receipts and entitlements, not changes in the value of shareholdings.

The recharacterisation (two-step) argument

The strongest version of the wider view would recharacterise the single release as two steps:

  1. Company A distributes the debt, or its value, to Mr X as its shareholder.
  2. Mr X contributes that value to Company B as capital.

On that analysis Mr X receives the distribution constructively at step 1 and is chargeable under s.385 ITTOIA 2005, even though in fact the value passed directly from Company A to Company B.

Where the two-step analysis comes from

The analysis is borrowed from group accounting. Where a subsidiary waives a debt owed by a fellow subsidiary, the waiver is not a transaction on commercial terms; it is made because the two companies are under common control. Accounting practice under FRS 102 therefore commonly treats it, in each company’s individual accounts, as passing through the common parent: a distribution by the lender to the parent, recorded in the lender’s equity rather than its profit and loss account, and a capital contribution by the parent to the borrower, credited to the borrower’s equity. The ICAEW guidance on realised and distributable profits (TECH 02/17BL) uses the same approach when considering how intra-group waivers affect distributable profits.

Why it does not support a charge on Mr X

First, it is an accounting convention, not a tax receipt. It matters in company law, because distributable profits are measured by reference to accounts (s.836 CA 2006). It does not create a receipt for income tax purposes. In a group, the parent is a company whose own accounts can reflect the two steps, and any distribution it is treated as receiving would generally be exempt under Part 9A CTA 2009. Mr X keeps no accounts, and nothing is recorded as passing through his hands.

Second, constructive receipt does not fit. A shareholder is taxed on a dividend paid to a third party at his direction because he was entitled to the dividend and chose where it went. Constructive receipt presupposes an entitlement that is redirected. Mr X never has any entitlement to Company A’s debt or its value. Whether or not he decides, as the controlling mind of both companies, that Company A should release Company B, he cannot redirect what he was never entitled to, and the value stays within the corporate envelope throughout.

Third, the Ramsay principle does not help the wider view. HMRC might argue that, under the Ramsay principle, the release should be viewed “realistically” as a distribution to Mr X. The cases show why that argument fails.

In W T Ramsay Ltd v IRC [1982] AC 300 a company that had made a large capital gain bought a ready-made scheme. It consisted of a series of pre-arranged transactions designed to produce an allowable loss to set against the gain. The steps cancelled each other out, and the company was left in the same position as when it started, apart from the fees. The House of Lords held that the scheme should be looked at as a whole rather than step by step.

Furniss v Dawson [1984] AC 474 extended this to steps that were not self-cancelling. The Dawsons agreed to sell shares in their family companies to a third party. To defer capital gains tax, they first exchanged them for shares in an Isle of Man company, which then sold them on to the buyer the same day. The House of Lords disregarded the Isle of Man step, which had no purpose other than tax, and taxed the Dawsons as if they had sold directly to the buyer.

Later cases made clear that Ramsay is not a special anti-avoidance doctrine but an application of ordinary statutory interpretation. Three points follow, therefore, for our example:

  • Ramsay looks through steps; it does not invent them. In each of these cases, the court either disregarded steps that were actually taken or asked whether an actual transaction fell within the statute. None inserts a step that never happened. The wider view would require exactly that: a distribution from Company A to Mr X, and a contribution by Mr X to Company B, neither of which took place.
  • Viewed realistically, there is one transaction. Company A releases a debt owed by Company B. There are no artificial or self-cancelling steps to disregard, and at no point does value reach Mr X. Ramsay therefore cannot supply the receipt that s.385 ITTOIA 2005 requires.
  • Read purposively, the charge does not apply. The distribution charge taxes value that a shareholder takes out of a company. Here nothing has been taken out. The value has moved from one of Mr X’s companies to another and remains in corporate hands.

Fourth, the argument proves too much. If indirect enrichment through the value of shares were a receipt, every undervalue transaction between sister companies would trigger an income tax charge on their common owners, without any statutory provision saying so.

What company law says about the recipient

Company law, on which the wider view relies, points against it on the question of who receives. The statutory rules in Part 23 CA 2006 test the paying company: s.830 CA 2006 permits a distribution only out of profits available for the purpose, and s.836 CA 2006 measures those profits by reference to the relevant accounts. The common law capital maintenance rule, stated in Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 App Cas 409 and applied in Aveling Barford, likewise asks whether the company has made an improper return of capital.

Neither identifies a recipient for tax purposes.

Where company law does identify a recipient, it is the transferee. In Aveling Barford the remedy lay against Perion, the company that received the property, as a knowing recipient holding it on constructive trust for the transferor. s.847 CA 2006 makes a member who receives an unlawful distribution, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that it was made in contravention of the rules, liable to repay it to the company. It’s a Wrap (UK) Ltd v Gula [2006] EWCA Civ 544 held that the member need only know the facts, not that the distribution breached the law.

In our example Company B is not a member of Company A, and Mr X has received nothing to repay. If the release is unlawful, it is Company B that holds the value company law requires to be restored to Company A.

Directors’ duties point the same way. Under s.172 CA 2006 Company A’s directors must act to promote the success of Company A, and under s.174 CA 2006 they must exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence. A release in breach of those duties may give Company A claims against its directors and, if the conditions for knowing receipt are met, against Company B. It does not make Mr X a recipient.

Practical points

Our analysis does not depend on how the release is documented: whoever decides on it, the value stays within the corporate envelope and nothing reaches Mr X. Even so, the documents should describe the transaction accurately, because the wider view, like any argument that the release is “in substance” something else, depends on the facts.

Record Company A’s reasons. Company A’s board minutes should explain why the release serves Company A’s interests, for example Company B’s inability to pay or Company A’s commercial interest in Company B’s survival. Its value is evidential for tax purposes. It shows that the release was a decision taken by Company A in its own interests. It was not something done to Mr X as a holder of Company A’s shares within s.1113(3) CTA 2010, nor a payment directed by him that could support a constructive receipt.

Document the release as a transaction between Company A and Company B. Make the release by deed if there is no consideration, and describe it as what it is: Company A releasing a debt owed to it by Company B.

The company law requirements discussed above, adequate distributable reserves under s.830 and s.836 CA 2006 and compliance with the directors’ duties under s.172 and s.174 CA 2006, are matters for Company A’s directors. They protect Company A’s creditors and the directors themselves. They have no bearing on whether Mr X is chargeable to income tax.

The corporation tax treatment

The corporation tax treatment of the release needs to be addressed separately. Company A and Company B are connected companies because Mr X controls both, so the connected companies rules in Part 5 CTA 2009 generally apply. Company A obtains no deduction for the debt released (s.354 CTA 2009), and Company B is not taxed on the credit arising from the release (s.358 CTA 2009).

Conclusion

The wider view and our view agree on the company law position. Company A’s release of Company B’s debt may be a distribution by Company A, following Aveling Barford and Progress Property cases, and Company A must have adequate distributable reserves under s.830 CA 2006.

We disagree on the tax consequence. The chain from s.383 ITTOIA 2005 through s.989 ITA 2007 to s.1000 CTA 2010 defines a distribution; it does not make Mr X its recipient.

The release is not done “in respect of shares” in Company A within Para B, s.1000(1) CTA 2010, read with s.1113(3) CTA 2010, because nothing is done to Mr X as holder of Company A’s shares.

Even if it were, s.385 ITTOIA 2005 does not point to Mr X. The distribution is not made or treated as made to him, he receives nothing, and he has no entitlement to anything. The only recipient is Company B, and company law confirms that any unlawful transfer must be recovered from Company B.

The wider view can reach Mr X only by recharacterising a single release as a distribution to him followed by a capital contribution. Neither the legislation, the constructive receipt principle, nor a purposive construction under Ramsay supports that.

Although the shareholder tax point is often presented to directors as a reason not to release an inter-company loan, in our view it should not deter them merely because both companies are owned by the same individual.